Low Cost and Compact Quantum Cryptography

We present the design of a novel free-space quantum cryptography system, complete with purpose-built software, that can operate in daylight conditions. The transmitter and receiver modules are built using inexpensive off-the-shelf components. Both modules are compact allowing the generation of renewed shared secrets on demand over a short range of a few metres. An analysis of the software is shown as well as results of error rates and therefore shared secret yields at varying background light levels. As the system is designed to eventually work in short-range consumer applications, we also present a use scenario where the consumer can regularly 'top up' a store of secrets for use in a variety of one-time-pad and authentication protocols.Comment: 18 pages, 9 figures, to be published in New Journal of Physic

Controlling passively-quenched single photon detectors by bright light

Single photon detectors based on passively-quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than a nanowatt. I describe a bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key distribution system containing such detectors. In this regime, all single photon detectors in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous illumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain detector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies polarization (or other parameter used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such that the target detector stops receiving light while the other detector(s) continue to be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon sensitivity and, when Eve modifies the polarization again, produces a single click. Thus, Eve has full control of Bob and can do a successful intercept-resend attack. To check the feasibility of the attack, 3 different models of passively-quenched detectors have been tested. In the experiment, I have simulated the intensity diagrams the detectors would receive in a real quantum key distribution system under attack. Control parameters and side effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be practically possible.Comment: Experimental results from a third detector model added. Minor corrections and edits made. 11 pages, 10 figure

An experimental implementation of oblivious transfer in the noisy storage model

10.1038/ncomms4418Nature Communications5